UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

901 ERNSTON ROAD LLC, . Case No. 3:18-cv-02442(AET)

Plaintiff,

402 East State Street

Trenton, NJ 08608 v.

BOROUGH OF SAYREVILLE ZONING BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT, et al.

Defendants.

April 25, 2018

11:00 a.m.

TRANSCRIPT OF A HEARING BEFORE HONORABLE ANNE E. THOMPSON UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

APPEARANCES:

For the Plaintiff: Marino Tortorella & Boyle, PC

By: KEVIN HARRY MARINO, ESQ.

437 Southern Boulevard Chatham, NJ 07928-1488

For the Borough of Piro Zinna Cifelli Paris & Genitempo LLC Sayreville Board of By: RICHARD A. GRODECK, ESQ.

360 Passaic Avenue Adjustment: Nutley, NJ 07110

Audio Operator Kimberly Stillman

Proceedings recorded by electronic sound recording, transcript produced by transcription service.

J&J COURT TRANSCRIBERS, INC. 268 Evergreen Avenue Hamilton, New Jersey 08619 E-mail: jjcourt@jjcourt.com

(609)586-2311 Fax No. (609) 587-3599

APPEARANCES (Cont'd):

McKenna, Dupont, Higgins & Stone For Borough of Sayreville: By: EDWARD G. WASHBURNE, ESQ.

229 Broad Street Red Bank, NJ 07701

Board of Adjustment:

For Sayreville Zoning McManimon, Scotland & Baumann, LLC Board of Adjustment: By: WILLIAM W. NORTHGRAVE, ESQ. By: WILLIAM W. NORTHGRAVE, ESQ. 75 Livingston Avenue, Second Floor 2

Roseland, NJ 07068

I N D E X

3

	PAGE
<u>EXHIBITS</u>	
Demonstrative exhibit showing proposed location	9
of facility	
Statistics Chart	11

WWW.JJCOURT.COM

```
THE COURT: Who do we have?
 1
 2
             MR. MARINO: Good morning, Your Honor.
 3
                               Plaintiff, who do we have?
             THE COURT: Yes.
 4
             MR. MARINO: It's Kevin Marino, Marino Tortorella &
 5
  Boyle for the plaintiff 901 Ernston Road LLC.
             THE COURT: Very well. And across the aisle?
 6
 7
             MR. GRODECK: Good morning, Your Honor, Richard
 8
   Grodeck, Piro Zinna for the Borough of Sayreville and the
 9
   Sayreville Board of Adjustment.
10
             THE COURT: Very well. Yes, sir.
11
             MR. WASHBURNE: Good morning, Judge, Edward
12 Washburne, McKenna, DuPont, Higgins & Stone and my firm is
   Borough Counsel in a general sense for the Borough of
13
14 Sayreville.
15
             THE COURT:
                         Very well.
16
             MR. NORTHGRAVE: Good morning, Your Honor, William W.
   Northgrave, McManimon, Scotland & Baumann on behalf of the
   Zoning Board. And just to be clear, Judge, Mr. Grodeck's role
19∥ is for the insured claims. I represent the Zoning Board on the
20\parallel uninsured claims, the prerogative of writ type claims as I
   think Mr. Washburn represents the Borough of Sayreville
21
   although can't announce if there's really any claims against
   the Borough just yet. It's solely against the -- as to
23
   prerogative writ they're solely against the Zoning Board.
25
             THE COURT: Very well. Now, I'd like for you, Mr.
```

1 Marino, to say for the record the status of this case. 2∥ other words, what has happened thus far from your filing, and where we are.

MR. MARINO: Your Honor, we --

3

4

5

6

11

16

17

19 l

21

22

23

24

25

THE COURT: And the rest of you may be seated.

MR. MARINO: Your Honor, we have filed, as the Court is aware, a verified complaint and together with that an order to show cause with temporary restraints. Your Honor entered the order to show cause and scheduled the hearing for this 10 morning.

And it is a hearing primarily at this juncture 12∥directed to our request that Your Honor order the Sayreville Board of Zoning Adjustment to enter the appropriate approval so that we may move forward with the neighborhood drug and substance abuse treatment facility in Sawyerville that is the subject of our application.

Since that allocation has been filed we have placed 18 before the Court all the relevant documents of the proceedings My friends across the table have filed their opposition, we've filed our replies, and Your Honor marked down this morning for a hearing on the subject. We have since had conversations with counsel for the Board, and conferenced the matter with Your Honor, and --

THE COURT: Well, even before --

MR. MARINO: -- that's where we stand at the moment.

6

8

9

11

17

18

19

20

2.1

22

6

THE COURT: -- conferencing with me this morning I 2 want to know what efforts were made between counsel from the time you came in here with your application to now. I mean, I 4 assume that the lawyers in a matter of this sort having to do $5\parallel$ with governmental bodies, having to do with approvals I would anticipate that the lawyers would try as best they can to resolve this through some even compromising efforts to see if in fact the parties could work this out.

MR. MARINO: And, of course, Your Honor's correct and 10 we have done that consistent with how we behave really in every case and particularly in a case as Your Honor indicates such as 12∥this one that involves a public body as well as a private entity such as RCA and 901 Ernston Road which is a wholly owned subsidiary of RCA. We've had conversations, I've spoken with Mr. Northgrave at length. I know that Mr. Northgrave has spoken with his client being the Board. He and I have been in fairly regular communication during the pendency of this application trying to find as Your Honor intimates here a path forward or a way to resolve this dispute. And that's -- we'd very much like, I think, to continue to talk to one another about where we stand.

As Your Honor is aware, we have claims here for the functional equivalent of an action in lieu of prerogative writs. That's in Counts 5 and 6 of our complaint. have a claim for monetary damages under various discrimination

```
1 statutes that are enumerated in our verified complaint. And so
 2 \parallel I think we're here today and I'll note the presence in the
  courtroom for Your Honor. You can see we have quite a crowd
 4 qathered.
 5
             THE COURT:
                         Yes.
                               I want more specificity as to who
 6\parallel is here because I want to know who's here prepared to testify.
 7
             MR. MARINO: Right.
 8
             THE COURT: And on both your side and on the side of
 9
   Sayreville, et al.
10
             MR. MARINO: With respect to the plaintiff's side,
11 Your Honor, I have in the courtroom the -- for my first witness
12∥ would be Deni Carise who is standing now. She was a witness
13∥ below and is prepared to testify about (a) the magnitude of the
14 opiate problem in Middlesex County and Sayreville in
15 particular, (b) the manner in which Recovery Centers of America
   and particularly the proposed facility at 901 Ernston Road
   would address that problem, the safety concerns that have
   animated some of the discussions -- animated some of the
   discussions at the Board level in this matter, the leasehold
19
   concerns, and particularly the danger of losing that lease and
20
   therefore --
2.1
22
             THE COURT: What is that right now?
23
             MR. MARINO: So, we're at a standstill.
24
             THE COURT: You got an extension.
25
             MR. MARINO: We got an extension in anticipation of
```

this proceeding, but we are --

1

2

3

5

8

9

10

11

19

21

22

23

THE COURT: What's your date now?

MR. MARINO: It's May 31st. And we are given to 4 believe, Your Honor, I can tell the Court I don't think I'm telling stories out of school to say as would be something the Court would expect in a transaction of this type. The owner of the property can't wait forever to see if it's actually going to be developed.

8

THE COURT: Obviously.

MR. MARINO: And so Your Honor will recall when we initially made this application the Court convened a telephone 12 conference and addressed the very obvious practical concern 13∥presented by the very tight time frame of trying to have a $14 \parallel$ hearing on a matter of this magnitude and to do so in a time 15 frame that would accommodate the -- what was then the leasehold termination date. And so at the Court's suggestion we went back and had further discussions and we're able to get a little, for lack of a better phrase, breathing room on that lease so that we could have at least the opportunity both to 20 explore possible resolution with the powers that be.

THE COURT: All right. Who else do you have as witnesses?

MR. MARINO: I also have James Higgins standing now, 24∥Your Honor, who'll be our planning expert. He'll be our second witness in the case.

2

3

7

8

9

11

12

17

18 l

20

21

22

23

24

9

THE COURT: What do you mean planning expert?

MR. MARINO: So he is a person who testified, he's an expert in the area of zoning and planning and he gave testimony 4 below on the extent to which the proposed facility would comply $5\parallel$ with and comport with local zoning rules and so forth. 6 gave that testimony below and would largely reiterate that testimony today.

Also, Your Honor, I have an exhibit -- demonstrative exhibit which I'll show to the Court that sets forth exactly where this proposed facility is situated.

THE COURT: Where is it? Where is it?

MR. MARINO: I'm going to ask my partner John Boyle 13∥to bring it forward and show Your Honor. I should say, Your Honor, that Mr. Boyle has done some fine work in this direction 15∥ of holding up exhibits in addition to the type of legal work he's done since clerking in this building for Judge Bongiovanni. I'm sure you'll find he's as good an easel as he was a law clerk. Move a little closer, if you would, to the 19 Judge.

THE COURT: Yes. Come around here. Would you get that easel, put it down, then get this easel behind me and then let it stand right here so I can see this. Fine. Now where on that map are we talking about?

MR. MARINO: This is the facility 901 Ernston Road would be here depicted somewhere near the center of this

1 demonstrative exhibit which is entitled legend 901 Ernston 2 Road. We have a Parkway here, and you see the school that has 3 been referred to as over this bridge from the facility and down 4 the road. And you'll notice it's essentially wooded area 5 surrounding the facility.

THE COURT: Is there anything else, any other business, any other company, any other activity?

6

7

8

9

15

17

18

19

20

21

There is not, Your Honor. As you can MR. MARINO: see it's surrounded on three sides by very substantial wooded 10 area and there's a rather substantial road that runs 11 perpendicular to the Parkway that separates this facility from 12 homes on the other side of that road. So I think -- I was hoping that this would give Your Honor the kind of physical 14 depiction, give you a sense of what we have planned.

So we would have, as I was saying, in addition to Mr. Higgins I've introduce Your Honor to Mr. Brian O'Neill seated in the front row.

THE COURT: Mr. O'Neill.

MR. O'NEILL: Good morning, Your Honor.

THE COURT: What would he be able to testify to?

MR. MARINO: Mr. O'Neill is a principal of the Recovery Centers of America so he has developed these centers all over the country. And primarily what I would ask him to share with Your Honor is a chart setting forth statistics that really accentuate the rather significant need for this type of

 $1 \parallel$ facility. And I envision him -- his testimony would be rather 2 | short, but I think important and would provide Your Honor with the ability to at least put some quantitative component to this 4 very significant problem. Give you a very good sense of the 5 magnitude of the problem.

My understanding, and I'll let Mr. Northgrave speak for himself, but my understanding is that he doesn't intend to offer witnesses. Obviously he would avail himself of the opportunity to cross examine our witnesses, but would rely on 10 the record below. I think I'm saying that correctly as far --11 and I'll let him do that. And with the Court's permission I'll 12 hand up the chart that I was referring to. And I'll give a 13 copy to Mr. Northgrave as well. This is the chart that Mr. O'Neill would explain to Your Honor. He's intimately familiar with these facts and figures and I think could answer any questions the Court has about them. May I approach, Your Honor?

> THE COURT: Yes. Thank you.

MR. MARINO: So really what this assesses is the extent to which, and I think puts rather graphically depicts just as our blowup here graphically --

THE COURT: The need.

MR. MARINO: Yes.

6

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

THE COURT: The need.

MR. MARINO: Graphically depicts the need just as our

1 blowup here graphically depicts this location as a prime $2 \parallel 1$ location to fill that need. This really puts the meat on the 3 bones for the Court as to the extent to which this is a very 4 significant and felt need.

So, that would be what our presentation would entail. Understanding Your Honor always likes to have a very complete record we brought witnesses here, not to elongate the proceedings, but to make certain that if the Court wishes --

THE COURT: Well, to put on your case.

5

6

8

9

10

12

14

17

20

21

24

25

MR. MARINO: Yes. Yes, Your Honor. And so we --11 sometimes these applications are handled on the papers --

THE COURT: So, the other persons who are here are 13 not witnesses.

MR. MARINO: That's correct, Your Honor. number of folks, lawyers, and other in-house executives from RCA. You can get a flavor just from the sheer numbers here the magnitude of this issue for RCA. It's obviously a very significant project, one they've been working on for a 19 considerable period of time. And I can tell Your Honor I've had the pleasure of representing RCA for a couple of years now. This is not the first application of this type that I've had. And the interest that you see manifested by their presence today is reflective of the serious commitment they have to this problem.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much.

```
MR. MARINO: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right, let's go to the other side and
```

I'd like to know how you would meet Mr. Marino's presentation.

MR. NORTHGRAVE: Thank you, Your Honor, William 5 Northgrave of McManimon, Scotland & Baumann. Judge, I have the 6 honor of representing a number of governments and what I've learned over the years is that my ability to defend anything they do lives and dies by the record that is made at the relevant hearing. In this case the Zoning Board hearing. in terms of, you know, I would certainly avail myself of the opportunity to cross examine any witnesses that come before the Court, but the evidence that my clients relied upon in rendering the judgment that plaintiffs now challenge is set forth in the transcripts and have previously been submitted and in the legal argument in our briefs. So, you know --

THE COURT: And you have no broader evidence --

MR. NORTHGRAVE: No, Judge. I --

THE COURT: -- to --18

1

2

3

4

10

11

12

16

17

19

21

22

23

24

25

MR. NORTHGRAVE: -- I don't think the Court would 20 allow me to. If I were to try to expand the record here I think the Court would rightfully shut me down. Because regardless of what I introduced no matter how compelling if it were not before the Zoning Board when they made their determination --

THE COURT: Well, if it were supportive of what went

2

3

6 II

8

9

10

11

15

21

22

14

on at the Zoning Board it would seem that the Court could hear it.

MR. NORTHGRAVE: Well, all that -- well, the short 4 answer Your Honor is that what is before the Court in terms of 5 the transcripts that have been submitted with both our pleadings and plaintiff's pleadings are what we rely on in support of the action and in defense of the action my client is taking here.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

MR. NORTHGRAVE: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Let me hear from counsel, the other 12∥attorneys just with regard to this proceeding and how you see yourself fitting in here and how this matter as you see it 14 could best be resolved.

MR. GRODECK: Good morning, Your Honor, Richard 16 Grodeck again from the firm Piro Zinna Cifelli Paris & Genitempo. As Mr. Northgrave pointed out earlier my firm has been assigned to defend and to represent the interest of both 19∥of the defendants, the Borough and the Zoning Board of Adjustment in respect of those claims for which damages are sought and for which indemnification is entitled under the policy. I have reviewed the underlying record. I happen to agree with Mr. Northgrave that the decisions of the Zoning Board as reflected in the transcript is what is to be reviewed by Your Honor. And I suppose that record could be expanded

3

5

10

11

12

13

14

16

18

19

21

22

23

15

1 upon, but not with the addition of facts, but perhaps only with the supplementation of opinion or basis.

But having read as recently as early this morning the 4 points made by each of the members of the Zoning Board I don't think that there's anything that can be offered to the Court to expand upon that. So I was prepared to examine witnesses based upon the underlying record, and what I understood to be the Court's directive, to be prepared today to confront the question of substantial likelihood of success on the merits and irreparable harm. And again, those are the issues before the Court largely in respect of, well, I guess, all of the counts in the complaint, but I was focusing on those that created federal questions of fact regarding the law and Section 1983.

THE COURT: Very well. Thank you very much. counsel, I'd like to hear how you see yourself in this --

MR. WASHBURNE: We represent the Borough as Borough Counsel in general. At this point in time I have nothing to add to what my colleagues have expressed to Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. This case is a substantial 20 case, one somewhat different from some of the applications we are faced with for emergency relief. The irreparable harm aspects and the likelihood of success were the two factors in Rule 65 that seemed to be the focus and in some ways different from some of the cases. But, nevertheless, our research with regard to previous cases across the country, in courts indicate

4

5

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

18

19

20

21

23

25

that the courts have been sensitive to these arguments which 2 plaintiff has asserted, and we had set the matter down for an 3 opportunity for witnesses to testify.

Now, before we do that, and I'm not going to decide at this point whether we will go forward with evidentiary 6 hearing, if the attorneys have some thought as to some ways that the Court's discussion with you in chambers could be effectuated in a way that would if not satisfy at least would do the least harm to each side. I always try to encourage that. So let me give you a little time before we actually begin any such evidentiary hearing to ask you to talk to each other, see what you can draft with each other, and we'll resume in a short time.

> THE ATTORNEYS: Thank you very much, Your Honor. (Recess)

THE COURT: After conferring with you on this proposed map, I guess, passed forward I had some questions and I appreciate it if you, Mr. Marino, can elaborate somewhat on the points that are really necessary in order to obtain the relief that you're seeking.

MR. MARINO: Thank you very much, Your Honor. With the Court's permission I'll begin with the discussion of the exhaustion of available remedies. As I believe the Court is aware discrimination claims become final even before the exhaustion of administrative remedies. In this case the

1 defendants have argued that the case is not ripe for 2 adjudication because we did not first file an action in lieu of prerogative writs in the Superior Court of New Jersey Law 4 Division seeking reversal of the denials of our zoning applications. And, specifically, they contend that we had to file this action in State Court in order to exhaust our That's incorrect. Our claims became ripe for review the moment defendants denied the zoning applications for unlawful and discriminatory reasons.

5

9

10

21

In the context of a zoning board's land use decisions 11 the finality rule exists not to require the exhaustion of 12 administrative remedies. And that's what the Third Circuit Court of Appeals said in Lauderbaugh, L-a-u-d-e-r-b-a-u-g-h, <u>v. Hopewell Township</u>, 319 F.3d 568 at 575 (3d Cir. 2003). Rather the rule exists to ensure that the local board is, quote, given an opportunity to arrive at a final definitive position regarding how it will apply the regulations at issue to the particular land in question. The Third Circuit said that in Taylor v. Upper Darby, 983 F.2d 1285 at 1291 (3d Cir. 20 1993).

As a result as the <u>Taylor</u> court said at Page 1291, quote, the finality rule allows a suit whenever a decision maker has arrived at a definitive position on the issue that 24∥ inflicts an actual concrete injury. For that reason the Third Circuit said in 2004 in Ethan Michael Incorporated v. Union

6

11

12

18

20

21

23

Township report at 108 Federal Appendix 43 at 47 the court should not, quote, stand on formality, but instead should, quote, look beyond whether the zoning hearing board formally rejected the application and determined whether the township 5 has made a final decision however that decision is manifested.

The import of all those decisions, Your Honor, is that complete exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required to establish that claims related to a land use decision such as the Sayreville Zoning Board made here are final and ripe for judicial resolution. And that was very much what the court said in Mag Realty, LLC v. The City of Gloucester, 2010 U.S. District Lexis 82035 at 19 (2010) decision of this court holding that a use variance application was not required to establish ripeness because the Board had a full and fair opportunity to find facts and apply the law to plaintiff's application and in so doing created a substantial record that aids the court in its review.

So, in the context of housing discrimination cases 19∥ courts have routinely found that claims are final and ripe at the time the accommodation is denied and no further exhaustion is required. I'd say also, Your Honor, even if the plaintiff were required to file an action in lieu of prerogative writs it was permitted to do so in the context of this case, that is to say to file claims that would otherwise be made in a prerogative writ action in this federal complaint.

6

9

10

11

12

14

19

21

23

example, House of Fire Christian Church v. Zoning Board of Adjustment of the City of Clifton, 426 N.J. Super. 157 (App. Div. 2012) a land owner asserted an action in lieu of 4 prerogative writs that succinctly raised conventional MLUL 5 claims with related federal claims.

So the New Jersey Appellate Division in that case made clear that a zoning applicant can bring a prerogative writ claim and a federal claim together in one complaint in either state or federal court. At Page 166 the court specifically said, quote, it is common that certain aggrieved land use applicants bring parallel state and federal claims as part of a state court action in lieu of prerogative writs or in federal 13 courts.

Cresci, C-r-e-s-c-i, v. Bayonne Parking Authority, it's a similar effect in the Appellate Division decision issued in 2011. A 2011 N.J. Super. unpublished Lexis decision at 61 where the Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal of an action in lieu of prerogative writs as violating the entire controversy doctrine given the pendency of a previously filed 20 federal suit.

So, the Appellate Division has made clear -- New Jersey Appellate Division has made clear it's permissible to bring an action in lieu of prerogative writs simultaneous with related federal claims in federal courts. As the Court is aware federal courts routinely exercise supplemental

5

6

8

9

11

13

14

19

20

21

23

jurisdiction over such claims. That was the case in Lapid-Laurel v. The Zoning Board of Adjustment, 248 F.3d 442 (3d Cir. 2002) and also in Cellular Telephone Company v. The Zoning Board of Adjustment, 90 F. Supp. 2d 557 (D.N.J. 2007) in which Judge Bassler found, quote, the court has supplemental jurisdiction to adjudicate plaintiff's action in lieu of prerogative writs challenging the Board's denial on state law grounds.

In sum, a zoning application is simply not required 10 to file in the law division an action in lieu of prerogative writs asserting violations of the MLUL before bringing federal 12 claims arising from the same conduct.

Now, having addressed that exhaustion of remedies argument, and I believe this satisfactorily explained to the Court why that's not a roadblock here, let me turn to the entitlement to this requested preliminary injunctive relief. As Your Honor is aware the Crowe v. DeGioia standard requires 18∥us to demonstrate (a) that threat of irreparable harm, (b) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, (c) that the balance of equities tips in our favor, and (d) that the public interest is served or would be served by the issuance of the 22 sought relief.

In this case the complainant search claims for, among 24 other things, violations of the Americans With Disabilities Act, the Fair Housing Act of 1968 as amended by the Fair

6 II

9

11

12

16

17

19

20

2.1

23

1 Housing Amendments Act of 1988, the Rehabilitation Act, and the 2 14th Amendment which claim is brought here through the enabling Statute 42 USC Section 1983, and the New Jersey Municipal Land 4 Use Law which are Counts 6 and 7.

The FHA, the ADA, the RA, and of course the 14th Amendment all make it unlawful to discriminate against those with disabilities. Under the Fair Housing Act it's unlawful to discriminate against or otherwise make unavailable or deny a dwelling to any buyer or renter because of a handicap of that buyer or renter or person residing in or intending to reside in a dwelling after it is sold, rented or made available, or any person associated with a buyer or renter. To discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling or in the provision of services or facilities in connection with such dwelling because it's handicap of course is improper.

The Rehabilitation Act, the Americans With Disabilities Act are to similar effect. Of course the Equal Protection Clause states that a law that treats a disabled person differently from one without a disability when the distinction bears no rational relationship to a legitimate state interest violates the protection clause.

Of course, the plaintiff here 901 Ernston Road has $24\parallel$ standing to bring claims for violation of these statutes, because as the operator of the proposed facility the drug and

alcohol treatment facility for which defendants wrongfully denied our zoning approvals we've suffered injury in fact sufficient to confer standing. I refer the Court to the McKivitz decision, 769 F. Supp. 2d at 817. Owner whose application for variance to use property as a group home for recovering alcoholics and drug addicts was denied by the Township Zoning Board had standing to sue even though the owner himself was not disabled. The Southern District of Florida held similarly in Caron Foundation of Florida v. City of Delray Beach, that the operator of that facility which serves qualified individuals with disabilities has standing to sue.

In this case the defendants have argued that 901

Ernston Road is not a suitable party to raise these claims

because it may not be able to allege an injury since no current

patients are joined in the action. That is not correct. In

New Directions Treatment Services v. City of Reading, a Third

Circuit decision at 490 F.3d 293 and similarly in Association

for the Advancement of the Mentally Handicapped v. The City of

Elizabeth, 876 F. Supp. 614 (D.N.J. 1994), and also in Township

of West Orange v. Whitman, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 408 this court in

1998 all have granted relief in identical circumstances where

the plaintiffs brought an action to build a new but as yet

unbuilt facility, and they were granted standing to do so.

The concept of speculative harm is separate and distinct from a prospective person patient and courts have

8

9

11

12

13 l

14

17

19

20

21

22

23

1 found irreparable harm to future patients. There simply is no $2 \parallel$ authority to the contrary. Here, Your Honor, if the injunction were not to be granted the plaintiff itself would continue to 4 suffer irreparable harm. And I refer Your Honor to North Jersey Vineyard Church v. The Township of South Hackensack, a 2016 decision at U.S. District Lexis 46398 at 8 quoting the Third Circuit's opinion in Minard Run Oil Company v. U.S. Forest Services, 670 F.3d 236 at 256, quote, where real property is at stake preliminary injunctive relief can be particularly appropriate because of the unique nature of the property interest though plaintiff is still required to demonstrate that irreparable harm will result for a temporary cessation of the alleged property right.

The FHA, the ADA, the RA and of course the Equal Protection clause all apply to municipal zoning decisions. McKivitz as we've already cited, as well as Bay Area Addiction Research & Treatment Inc. v. The City of Antioch, a Ninth Circuit case from 1999 at 179 F.3d 725, 730 specifically held the ADA and the RA, quote, do apply to zoning. In Larkin v. The State of Michigan Department of Social Services the Six Circuit in 1996, 89 F.3d 285, 289 held, quote, congress explicitly intended for the FHAA to apply to zoning ordinances.

Drug and alcohol addiction which are the disabilities 24 that animate the entire reason for RCA to be in existence are disabilities without any question under the FHA, the ADA, and

5

8

9

11

17

18

19

20

2.1

22

23

In Oxford house Incorporated v. The Township of Cherry the RA. <u>Hill</u>, 799 F. Supp. 450 at 459 this court said in 1992, quote, it is clear that congress contemplated alcoholism and drug 4 addiction as being among the kinds of impairments covered under this definition. 28 CFR 41.31(b)(1)(I) defines drug addiction and alcoholism as, quote, physical or mental impairment qualifying as a handicap under the ADA.

In <u>Braqdon v. Abbott</u> the United States Supreme Court at 524 U.S. 624 at 631 in 1998 said the FHA, the ADA and the RA define what qualifies as a disability or handicap almost identically. Under these statutes a disability is a physical $12 \parallel$ or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of a person's major life activities. In RHJ Medical Center Inc. v. City of DeBois, 754 F. Supp. 2d 723 at 756 2762 the court on the Western District of Pennsylvania said in 2010 that both alcohol is an opioid addiction which is a principal focus of Recovery Centers of America and of 901 Ernston Road may and often do substantially limit major life activities.

We know that the deaths that have been suffered and continue to be suffered on a daily basis throughout the United States, throughout the State of New Jersey in particular and in Middlesex County are really quite staggering. Individuals recovering from drug and alcohol addiction qualify as disabled therefore under all these anti-discrimination laws Lakeside Resorts Enterprises LP v. The Board of Supervisors of Palmyra

<u>Township</u>, 455 F.3d 154, 156 at Note 5 the Third Circuit said, quote, recovering alcoholics and drug addicts are handicapped so long as they are not currently using illegal drugs.

Courts consistently have found as Your Honor averted to, I believe, at the top of the hour violations of these statutes where municipalities applies zoning laws to impede an addiction treatment provider's ability to open and operate in the community, MX Group Incorporated v. The City of Covington, 293 F.3d 326 (6th Cir. 2002) affirmed a judgment in favor of a drug treatment provider challenging the denial of a zoning permit and ordinance targeting methadone clinics as discriminatory under the ADA and the RA or Rehabilitation Act.

Again, Oxford House, referred to a few moments ago, v. Township of Cherry Hill, 799 F. Supp. 450 found the Township's ordinance discriminatory under the FHA and enjoined the defendant from enforcing it against the operator of a residential rental home for individuals recovering from alcoholism and drug addiction.

As the Court is aware there are three types of discrimination under the FHA, the ADA and the RA. Plaintiffs alleging violations of those statutes' prohibitions on discrimination against the disabled can proceed under any or all of three related theories of liability, disparate treatment theory, the disparate impact theory, and the failure to make reasonable accommodations theory as was the case in <u>Lapid-</u>

2

3

5

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

19

20

21

22

23

Laurel LLC v. The Zoning Board of Adjustment of Scotch Plains, 284 F.3d 442 at 448.

Here, we have presented below and would present here, 4 have witnesses here to present to Your Honor were we not able to simply summarize the thrust of their testimony as the Court 6 has indicated it's willing to hear. That clearly establishes liability first under the disparate treatment theory. Just to go over the legal framework quite briefly, to prevail on a disparate treatment claim as the Court is aware, the plaintiff must demonstrate that some discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor behind the challenge --

THE COURT: And how do we have that here?

MR. MARINO: I'm sorry, Your Honor?

THE COURT: And how do we have that here?

MR. MARINO: We have it here, Your Honor, because when you look at what the Board has done in this case what they have said, one Board member actually said I could not look my neighbor in the eye and tell him that I had voted for this facility to permit this facility, because it's unsafe. a safety threat. And I would suggest to Your Honor that that is one hundred percent driven by a pre-existing animist, a stereotype with respect to recovering drug addicts and alcoholics that doesn't even obtain, doesn't even make sense. But if you think about it where would we ever have a drug treatment or an alcohol treatment facility permitted in any

community in this nation if the answer was I can't look my neighbor in the face and tell him I voted for it?

THE COURT: And disparate impact?

1

2

3

4

5

9

11

12

18

19

20

21

23

MR. MARINO: The disparate impact also, Your Honor, I believe could not be clearer in this case. And if you think about this and just take a moment to think about the idea of whether this defendant acted with discriminatory intent and came -- actually effectuated a discriminatory impact where are these people to go to get the kind of extraordinary care that RCA offers throughout the United States? Where are they to go? The impact on them is that they will not get treated.

The discriminatory impact is if you were doing 13∥ something else, and you know how we know this, we know this because the Zoning Board of Adjustment in this case specifically granted a variance for a nursing home. The answer to that is older folks who are going to be housed in a facility and receive treatment for their infirmities, they're fine. if you have a drug problem or an alcohol problem the social stigma associated with that convinces us that you're not fine and you can't be here.

I think it's great -- if you took a survey of every legislature, local and state, to consider this issue I assure you of two things, number one every single one of them would acknowledge the magnitude of the drug problem and particularly the opioid crisis in this country. Every single one, because

3

5

6

8

9

10

11

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

it's undeniable. And number two none of them want it in their 2∥ neighborhood. Why not? Because they perceive their role not just as protecting all their constituents which, by the way, in 4 Sayreville, in Middlesex County, in New Jersey and throughout the 50 states comprises a very large number of the addicted, those who are shunned and feared. Perhaps irrationally, but shunned and feared because of their illness.

Can you imagine a circumstance in which someone wanted to put a cancer treatment facility in a neighborhood in Sayreville and the Board would say I could never do that because I couldn't look in the eyes of someone in my neighborhood and tell them I voted for it? No, because everybody has been touched by that kind of illness and there's no social stigma associated with it. Using drugs is not illegal. There's never been a war on cancer at least not one that's ever worked any better than the war on drugs has worked. But we know what's really going on here. Everybody recognizes the problem, everybody wants these people to be treated, everybody knows that denying them reasonable accommodations is not lawful under any of these statutes or under the constitution, but no one wants it in their neighborhood.

THE COURT: All right. And so the irreparable harm is as you can encapsulate it.

MR. MARINO: Yes. As I would encapsulate it, it's two-fold. First of all the irreparable harm here is every

8

9

11

17

18

19

20

21

23

single day that goes by without those in need receiving this treatment is an instance of irreparable harm. And courts around the country have said it. Courts around the country $4 \parallel$ have said it in no uncertain terms. You know, this notion of, 5∥ you know, we take a crab view of irreparable harm, right, it's a very crab view of irreparable harm. We think of it according to the normal construct of will dollars do? Dollars certainly will not do to remedy this problem.

I refer Your Honor to Gresham v. Windrush Partners <u>Limited</u>, reported at 730 F.2d 1417 at 423 to 24, an 11th Circuit decision. The substantial likelihood of an FHA violation gives rise to a presumption of irreparable harm, a presumption, and shifts the burden to defendants to prove that any injury that may occur is not irreparable. But even without a presumption even if a presumption did not arise as the court Southern District of New York stated in the 1996 decision Innovative Health Systems, Inc. v. The City of White Plains, reported at 931 F. Supp. 222 at 240, quote, courts have held that the deprivation of treatment needed to recover from addiction or prevent relapse constitutes irreparable injury.

In addition, irreparable injury exists wherever there's a deprivation of housing or services that poses a serious risk of harm to vulnerable individuals, Easter Seal Society v. The Township of North Bergen, 798 F. Supp. 228, 237 District of New Jersey 1992, quote, for each day that this

project is delayed eight protected individuals are forced to 2 move into other environments which endanger their recent 3 recovery constituting irreparable harm.

4

9

10

11

12

17

18

2.0

2.1

23

Oxford House Evergreen v. The City of Plainfield, 769 $5 \parallel F$. Supp. 1329 at 1345 (D.N.J. 1991) closure of a group home for 6 substance abusers would cause irreparable harm due to the loss of home and supportive and stable environment. Prospective patient's delay in receiving treatment as a result of defendant's actions constitutes imminent irreparable harm. And irreparable harm of the worse possible kind. You're not bringing that person back to life. The emergency rooms of our state's hospitals are crammed with folks who are suffering. And many of these folks, many of these folks have none or should have none of the stigma that's normally associated with a drug use. You know we have this image of someone who makes a choice. It's a complete misapprehension of what it means to suffer from this illness.

THE COURT: All right. And you can tie that in with 19∥ what you see as likelihood of success.

MR. MARINO: I don't think we can lose, Your Honor. I don't think we -- not only do I think we don't have -- we have a substantial likelihood of success on the merits I don't think we can lose. I think it's ineluctable. I don't think they have a leg to stand on and I think they know it. outrageous thing. Think about this, how do I lose under all

5

9

10

11

12

13

19

20

21

22

23

those discrimination statutes when I have demonstrated so 2 palpably that they are being violated, that there isn't a reason in the world to say I'm not going to treat this person 4 because it has a stigma associated with its illness?

Yet, I'd readily give and have this very Board has 6 given approval for a nursing home to treat older individuals, because our perception is someone becomes on in years and we want to do what we can to help them, and they don't pose any danger or threat.

I would tell you also this safety concern is so overstated. You're taking folks out of the community who if they pose a threat, if they are among those drug addicted individuals who in fact pose a threat because they need their drugs and they're going to do whatever they need to do to get those drugs those people are in the community. These people are not being imported into Sayreville. The notion isn't to bring people into the United States who somehow are this distinct class of drug addicted persons, this vast threat. That's not what this is.

These are the people among you many of whom became addicted to opioids because they had an injury, often a sports injury, perhaps a back injury, perhaps they suffered from a fall and the doctor thought it made good sense for them to have OxyContin and the next thing you know that person is doing everything in his or her power to get that drug, they crave

1 that drug, their physiological craving for that drug is $2 \parallel$ overwhelming and the next thing you know they are using heroin. How many children do we have to lose to this problem, this 4 extraordinary rampant problem before we say you know what, you got to allow us to put these treatment facilities in and if you don't you're violating all these anti-discrimination laws?

5

6

7

8

9

12

13

16

18

20

2.1

23

25

THE COURT: All right. Now what about defense? Let me hear from the other side.

MR. MARINO: If I may just to round out one thing I'd 10 | like to add on our presentation if you don't mind, Your Honor. 11 You've asked us about substantial likelihood of success and irreparable harm. If you're satisfied with our presentation there I'll move on. But I would address the balance of the equities of the public interest if the Court requires that or 15 would like to hear it. It's obviously in our papers.

THE COURT: Yes, it's in your papers, and quite frankly those elements are sort of subsumed in your irreparable harm arguments. So I'm satisfied that you don't need to 19 elaborate on that.

MR. MARINO: On the subject of irreparable harm and the likelihood or the substantial likelihood of success on the merits I want to be certain I've left no stone unturned. Does the Court have any question of me whatsoever whereby I might illuminate either of those issues any further?

THE COURT: Is the Court to consider that you could

find some other place, some other locale?

1

2

3

11

12

13

14

16

2.1

23

MR. MARINO: My testimony -- the testimony that I would put on of Dr. Carise would establish that there is not a $4 \parallel$ place within 100 miles. To be exactly accurate I think it's 88 5 and a half miles in one case or 95 and a half miles. 6 where the facilities that provide this kind of neighborhood treatment provide. If we were to put all of our evidence on the record or the evidence that was put on the record at the Zoning Board I would illuminate for Your Honor in graphic detail that this type of neighborhood facility simply does not exist. Not in Sayreville, not within 88 and a half miles of Sayreville. And if it's not permitted these people are just left bereft. They're left --

THE COURT: No, I just mean find another spot. another place in or around Sayreville.

MR. MARINO: Let me draw Your Honor's attention, if I may for a moment, perhaps I will provide Your Honor -- I'm referring now to a blowup of a legend which depicts 901 Ernston Road and I will provide Your Honor for your review in chambers, I'll provide you with a smaller version of this. But if you look at this I can't fathom a more appropriate locale. locales are chosen with care. It's important that they -sure, to be isolated to some extent very important. You see here the suggestion that 901 Ernston Road is somehow near a school. You can see that the school is well across the Garden

1 State Parkway, you would have to cross over a bridge to get 2 there. It's surrounded, nearly completely by wooded area as 3 Your Honor can see clearly depicted on the legend. And the 4 residential area is on the other side of another major road that runs perpendicular to the parkway. So in terms of choosing a spot take a look at the this other photo.

5

6

7

8

9

11

13 II

20

21

THE COURT: It does seem to be a well chosen spot, I must say.

MR. MARINO: And chosen with enormous care, chosen 10 with -- you know, everyone wants to be in the best possible spot. We want it to be in a place where it's close enough to 12 \parallel the community so these people will have the benefit of family. Remember, these are family members. It's not -- you know, many of our -- the other -- I don't want to even refer to them as competitors, but other treatment facilities you hear about this, we've heard about this for years. You send someone off to Utah, fly them to Florida, send them out to California, and they go out there and they have their period of 21, 30, 45 days whatever it is, and then they return to your community. It's like ship you away. That's not what we do.

Families are involved. Families are part of the treatment. This is so important. It's so much the impetus for forming this company. When Mr. O'Neill formed this company he formed it with this very idea of a neighborhood facility. So you face the added hurdle of wanting to have a neighborhood

6

17

18

19 II

20

21

22

23

1 based place where you can actually have this kind of continuing 2∥ meaningful continuing care. We have on-sight, on campus, we have NAR-ANON meetings, we have AA meetings, you have aftercare, you have a commitment to completion, you have a commitment to success.

Everyone knows you are -- once you fall prey to drug addiction the rest of your life -- or full prey to alcoholism the rest of your life is a period of recovery. So you ask him he's in recovery. He could be in recovery for many, many years. The architect of RCA's business Dr. Carise is a person who herself before going -- and her record is extraordinary. 12 Her record of service after herself falling prey to drug 13∥addiction who has been recovering for 32 years became the architect of this system is in the courtroom today. Dr. Carise who has gone to various countries in Africa and Asia around the world to help build these kinds of facilities, and who's the architect of our neighborhood based approach.

It's all designed to take care of these folks in the best possible setting. Safety concerns, we have addressed safety concerns, to use a colloquialism, six ways from Sunday. We have monitors on the grounds. We have all sorts of surveillance ongoing there. We take very seriously the safety concerns. But this is not a situation where people who sign in -- voluntarily sign in to get well are somehow those who you might expect to try to bust out. That's not really what

1 happens. People can leave on their own volition. When they $2 \parallel$ want to leave we try to persuade them to stay. If they choose 3 to leave we get a family member to come and get them. We don't 4 let anybody simply walk off the premises, and we will call the 5 local police if we think there's anything remotely approaching 6 that. But these are the kind of concerns that, you know, when you're building this sort of --

THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much. $9 \parallel you very much, Mr. Marino. I don't want to cut you off, but I$ 10 don't want to strain the patience of others as well. I'd like 11 to hear from defense counsel. At least they're here and their position should be on the record. Thank you very much. You 13 may have a seat.

MR. MARINO: Thank you, Your Honor.

8

12

14

15

21

23

25

MR. NORTHGRAVE: Thank you, Your Honor. 16 record William Northgrave, McManimon, Scotland & Baumann on behalf of defendants Zoning Board on the government claims. Specifically I will be very brief, Your Honor. We will be relying on our papers. The Court has the pleadings in front of you. The book I carried in is about five inches thick so my apologies to the Court for the amount of material there. But that is the record that was made. And as I said previously I have to, again, to use a colloquialism, I have to live and die by the record we've created.

I just want to address one -- two items quickly.

8

9

11

13 II

15

16

2.1

23

25

One, we're not addressing the RA, the FHA, the ADA today. 2 Really the question before the Court is, is there a right to 3 relief under -- in the prerogative writ sense? And that is and 4 boils down to its essence were are the safety and security 5 concerns as discussed by the Zoning Board sufficient to create the denial of the zoning as requested here? That is really the issue. I say it solely so the record is clear.

I understand plaintiff's position, but I think it's unfair to the Zoning Board to say that they were somehow discriminatory in their denial here. They had a concern as to the safety and security and that is the only issue that I think 12∥ is before the Court. If that issue is legitimate then, you know, that -- then the prerogative writ should be denied. if the Court finds it's not then the Court will make its determination.

As to just so the record is clear Mr. Marino was referring to a drawing that indicates the facility and location to other places in town. I have reviewed that drawing. 19∥drawing is accurate so we would stipulate for purposes of the record that that is an accurate drawing. It doesn't need any witnesses. I conferred with the other defense counsel before I made that representation to the Court. So we're all in agreement. So we don't need anything further in terms of a witness to authenticate or anything like that.

But unless the Court has questions of me my arguments